UN decries hike in satellite navigation system interference

The UN's International Telecommunication Union, its International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization jointly voiced "grave concern" at growing disruptions of so-called Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS).

Amid growing geopolitical tensions, GPS and other such systems, which are used for weapons systems but also for a vast array of vital civilian applications, have increasingly been targeted.

There have been warnings of increased GNSS signal disruptions since the start of Russia's war in Ukraine, as well as amid the Middle East conflict.

The UN agencies voiced alarm at the impact of disruptions to such systems, which they pointed out are used for everything from the navigation of civil aircraft, maritime vessels and humanitarian assistance vehicles to synchronising telecommunications networks.

They demanded countries do more to protect the systems against so-called jamming attacks, which prevent access to satellite signals, as well as spoofing, through the broadcasting of false signals that can cause GNSS receivers in vessels or aircraft to calculate erroneous positions.

"Global Navigation Satellite Systems are critical to our safety on land, at sea and in the air," said ITU chief Doreen Bogdan-Martin.

"Member States should ensure the uninterrupted operation of these systems for everyone's safety and the resilience of essential services that our lives depend on."

The joint statement called on countries to enhance the protection of the critical RNSS radio-frequency band, where GNSS systems operate.

The band should be protected against "transmissions that can adversely cause harmful interference degrading, interrupting or misleading signals used for civilian and humanitarian purposes," the statement added.

It also urged states to "reinforce resilience of the systems that rely on RNSS for navigation, positioning and timing" and to report all cases of "harmful interference".

And it demanded they "retain sufficient conventional navigation infrastructure for contingency support in case of RNSS outages and misleading signals", as well as to "develop mitigation techniques for loss of services".